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Description: I'm just a random guy on the Tor/I2P network making blogs enjoy.
Via @agowa338 Klaus Frank on Twitter
https://docs.microsoft.com/de-de/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/service-accounts#bkmk-virtualserviceaccounts https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/dd548356(v=ws.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN#using-virtual-accounts
We believe Tor is strongest when it is used by and supported by as many people as possible. A diverse user base strengthens the anonymity of Tor users, and diverse funding sources ensure we are only beholden to our mission -- no single financial source.
We are pleased to announce that we raised more funds in 2019 from individuals than ever before -- $833,956! This is almost double what we raised in 2018. A little over $300,000 of this income was donated during our end-of-year campaign and was generously matched by Mozilla. Thank you to everyone who contributed. You are helping Tor take back the internet.
In 2019, 10,404 people made their first donation to Tor. It is exciting to see so many people understand and commit themselves financially to our mission. Even more exciting is that, during the campaign alone, we gained 330 new Defenders of Privacy -- donors who make a monthly commitment to Tor. Sustaining gifts provide the Tor Project with steady, reliable income that is essential to our ability to respond quickly to unexpected challenges and threats. We also had eight donors make new contributions of $1,000 or more, making them Champions of Privacy.
Our commitment to privacy extends to our donors. We execute our fundraising in a way that is very different than other nonprofits. We never share your information with third parties. We never receive potential new donor information from outside sources. We do not track the behavior of our donors when you open our emails. We allow donors to choose what information you share with us. You can be more anonymous by sending a money order to our physical address or utilizing cryptocurrency to protect your personal information. Privacy is limited by requirements of the most popular donation methods, PayPal or credit card, but we are committed to offering privacy-preserving methods of making donations.
This income raised from individuals is essential for us to make progress on our 2020 goal to scale our network, making Tor easily accessible to everyone, while providing privacy online and tools to circumvent censorship. As Isabela Bagueros, our executive director said, “How do we actualize a more private, decentralized, equitable internet? It will take a lot of work and a unified vision. It takes preparing the Tor network to handle more users by scaling the network and improving its performance metrics. It takes the Anti-Censorship team working on circumvention solutions that are difficult and expensive for censors to block, but easy for us to deploy and scale. It takes the Tor Browser, Community, and UX teams working together to make Tor more accessible to the people who need it the most.” We have that unified vision. With your help, we are ready to take on this work.
You make a difference. Your help contributed to our goal of taking back the internet with Tor! Thank you.
Sincerely,
The Tor Project Fundraising Team
Description: anon anime
Tor Browser 9.5a4 is now available from the Tor Browser Alpha download page and also from our distribution directory.
Note: This is an alpha release, an experimental version for users who want to help us test new features. For everyone else, we recommend downloading the latest stable release instead.
This release features important security updates to Firefox.
This new alpha release picks up security fixes for Firefox 68.4.0esr and 68.4.1esr. In addition, this release updates the bundled NoScript extension to its latest version.
The issue with reproducible builds mentioned in the 9.0.1 blog post is now resolved in this release.
The full changelog since Tor Browser 9.5a3 is:
Tor Browser 9.0.4 is now available from the Tor Browser download page and also from our distribution directory.
This release fixes a critical security issue in Firefox: CVE-2019-17026.
The full changelog since Tor Browser 9.0.3 is:
Tor Browser 9.0.3 is now available from the Tor Browser download page and also from our distribution directory.
This release features important security updates to Firefox.
This new stable release picks up security fixes for Firefox 68.4.0esr. We also updated Tor to 0.4.2.5 for the desktop versions. On Android we fixed a possible crash after the bootstrap.
As with previous releases since 9.0, a bug in our toolchain is making it more difficult to reproduce our builds (a second rebuild is sometimes required to get a matching build). Fortunately, we now have a fix for this issue, which we are testing in the alpha series, so this should be fixed in the stable release that we'll have in February.
Mozilla is preparing a new Firefox version, 68.4.1, fixing an additional issue, therefore we are planning to release version 9.0.4 of Tor Browser picking up this fix soon.
The full changelog since Tor Browser 9.0.2 is:
Closing the decade, I’m pleased to announce Stem 1.8, the final release in Stem’s 1.x series, and with it, Python 2.x support.
What is Stem, you ask? For those who aren’t familiar with it, Stem is a Python library for interacting with Tor. With it you can script against your relay, descriptor data, or even write applications like Nyx.
So what’s new in this release?
Through our descriptor archive, CollecTor, Stem can now read Tor’s network topology at any prior point in time.
For example, listing today’s exits is as simple as…
import datetime import stem.descriptor.collector yesterday = datetime.datetime.utcnow() - datetime.timedelta(days = 1) exits = {} for desc in stem.descriptor.collector.get_server_descriptors(start = yesterday): if desc.exit_policy.is_exiting_allowed(): exits[desc.fingerprint] = desc print('%i relays published an exiting policy today...\n' % len(exits)) for fingerprint, desc in exits.items(): print(' %s (%s)' % (desc.nickname, fingerprint))
% python demo.py 1229 relays published an exiting policy today... MrExit (D628F6BB2330B3F78DBB4BED466B0A586D74782E) pangea03 (F21DFB7CCD5EEF3E021086EC96EF7CFCAA72F4F3) MacarenaValdes (5E3FD31B9DC279C06AD051D68BE08914F6CD3B46) TEMPORA (05EAA0696DCB694D6811042348DACD5059FE64AD) Quintex43 (1E5136DDC52FAE1219208F0A6BADB0BA62587EE6)
Bandwidth Authorities generate the latency heuristics that govern Tor’s path selection. Guiding circuits to be fast, without overburdening individual relays.
With Stem you can peruse this information…
import stem.descriptor.remote import stem.util.str_tools bandwidth_file = stem.descriptor.remote.get_bandwidth_file().run()[0] print('Bandwidth measurements are...\n') for fingerprint, measurement in bandwidth_file.measurements.items(): bandwidth = '%s/s' % stem.util.str_tools.size_label(1024 * int(measurement.get('bw', '0'))) print(' * %s (%s) averaged %s' % (measurement.get('nick', ''), fingerprint, bandwidth))
Bandwidth measurements are... * DigiGesTor1e1 (0111BA9B604669E636FFD5B503F382A4B7AD6E80) averaged 23 MB/s * WonderWoman42 (E5AA85FA69CDC31900C86E6427C7E5DE11DE9E2D) averaged 37 MB/s * alterspalter (B6F0BC2B93CB3EFFFFF724CB4F5E025FB15EFB70) averaged 2 MB/s * blueberry (FE80E192AD48A1BEB02D88EBC7663061176E1A79) averaged 1 KB/s ...
With George’s help Stem now reads, decrypts, and even creates HSv3 descriptors. For example…
from stem.descriptor.hidden_service import ( HiddenServiceDescriptorV3, InnerLayer, IntroductionPointV3, ) print(HiddenServiceDescriptorV3.content( inner_layer = InnerLayer.create( introduction_points = [ IntroductionPointV3.create('1.1.1.1', 9001), IntroductionPointV3.create('2.2.2.2', 9001), IntroductionPointV3.create('3.3.3.3', 9001), ], ), ))
% python demo.py hs-descriptor 3 descriptor-lifetime 180 descriptor-signing-key-cert -----BEGIN ED25519 CERT----- AQgABqvHAX8wXzJY+FqoJQPXNZ8u+SQGPZ1WN/r3hUna0R2AXQnEAQAgBAAuqibl ALcKa/4nHtLZn2zKV8L4XIpkRyRm7btWPLpYN5Gseb03H5exL+I3SqfG3uNDw5QK CmPlCQUy3usouSwhO/qWgdy0//bP5kRDma5GDXXWoi3+xTKM6Jez7TGxPAU= -----END ED25519 CERT----- revision-counter 1573695064 superencrypted -----BEGIN MESSAGE----- aDJodcMjhCvz1K7JCJEAH1H24hvoZ7gZw53AhPdvpHu+5d1Ogwio4qcIXEK1pEgy QFF1fE6tnCzsk++eMa2WaKwIJYGLPoCnta78H5Ve6VoMj+Pyb5rE6wPTMTPSVm6M UjllArr7DS8YcofloDxu3iwC3JZYFt/LB6ahq6lBKeot2BD/11pNggkZrZOCLgNQ pUVyQau7K8ynagVlNNESnI3FccOBaBB4Xa5mObK2ylyiLQ08MqaImW7X2gxeZltT /C/xtiJXGm2CzkjPpBpMWm09p7/a97GEWca5e8+fhpmGrN7zjAwjYInTvQHS5AyU 7eUFg8ItrRxAiRq4fbe/zepiq2vgfj1Pt7uxC0KCTcLWpd9O/FIvcFSk27Yrtniw ... etc... -----END MESSAGE----- signature VDDXXLvgU6qjRI4zfJR3GbQuVjz98qO0LI5gsI60LtGXK2POZ4E+3YVVWuVaEkvMsZaku5qCutIcu74/WQMxCQ
I2PSnark currently waits for a user-defined period before loading torrents if auto-start is enabled. This prevents the torrents from displaying in the UI until tunnels are opened for I2PSnark.
To improve the user experience, loading the torrents into the UI when I2PSnark is started and then starting the torrents after the configured delay might be considered. This would prevent the "No Torrents loaded" message from displaying, and enable immediate access to finished torrents. Loaded torrents that are set to autostart could display the starting icon to differentiate between stopped torrents.
split out from #2679, different subsystem
requesterbox to enter susidns name and automatic registration of susiDNS petname
Description: I2P Manual in Chinese
Description: Radio M16 live stream address.
Description: nothing to know....
Create a pre-defined tunnel with target localhost:PORT and let this be a default tunnel for external services like apache2. For new users: start I2P, setup apache on localhost:PORT, set this predefined tunnel to autostart, done.
Enhancement 2: (different subsystem, copied to #2680)
Hello Tor supporters!
As we approach the end of 2019, it's hard to believe that it has been more than a year since I transitioned into the role of Executive Director here at the Tor Project. It has been a great adventure, and I am happy to share with you some meaningful strides we made in the direction of the goals I laid out in my first email as ED.
In 2019, our fundraising team helped strengthen the Tor Project by expanding our sources of income and making progress in our work to diversify our funding. We’ve done so by improving our relationships with individual donors and acquiring grants from new sources. We also launched our cryptocurrency donation page, which became an important source of income.
I am also happy to share our efforts to make Tor a better organization by defining our culture and ensuring the happiness and stability of our members. For the first time, we completed a peer feedback cycle at Tor, something that staff had requested for a long time. The feedback process is focused on the individuals and their personal growth.
We also changed how our Tor meetings are organized so that we partner with local collectives to help us with food and other logistics. I believe everyone at Tor who attended the meeting in Stockholm would say that this new approach reflects our culture.
We also did a lot of great work on the product side in 2019, but before I go into that, I want to talk about how we are investing in placing our users to the center of our development. The choices we’ve made on the development side of Tor are informed by our meetings with approximately 800 users in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
We started 2019 by launching our Tor Browser for Android stable release, where the browser would connect to the Tor network without the user needing to get a second app (Orbot): a big step in providing support to mobile users. We redesigned our website and improved the behavior of major features on Tor Browser, blending them in with how things work on Firefox, so it feels more like other browsers.
We created our new Anti-Censorship team, who embraced the development of Snowflake, a great circumvention solution that's easy for anyone to deploy (simply download and run an extension on your Firefox browser) and help out with bandwidth, yet very hard for the censor to block. We are ending the year by starting another new team, our Network Health team, to help us make sure our network is safe for our users.
Our Network team worked hard in 2019 improving the network and fix some important security issues. They also worked on improving the code and internal development processes in general, something that will lay the foundation for important improvements to the protocol in 2020.
For Tor, 2020 will be all about scaling. We will continue to scale our organization; our sources of income; and of course, the Tor network, its accessibility, and its reachability. This looks like working to:
On the organization side, we want to make sure the Tor Project is a place where people are happy to work and that our staff have what they need to accomplish all of the above. This means we need to continue to scale our income sources, so we can use this money to invest in our people. For an idea, 93% of Tor’s budget is spent on our people. Any organization with decentralized teams has to make sure that folks don’t forget the human side of the work. Our goal is to make sure the Tor Project stays a people-first organization.
You can help us accomplish these goals. The world needs a better online experience, and it must be built with privacy by default. That much is clear. Every gift you make brings us closer to accomplishing our 2020 goals… and taking back the internet.
Description: loading ...
Description: Personal blog where I publish thoughts and small texts. Mostly in swedish.
Photo by Barton Gellman
The ongoing fight for digital rights has seen major victories and setbacks this year, and some of these victories would not have been possible without the leaks from Edward Snowden. Snowden bravely blew the whistle on the mass surveillance undertaken by the United States government, and his revelations have informed the public of widespread privacy abuses taking place and helped people understand the urgency of taking back the internet. Thank you, Snowden.
You can read about Snowden’s path to becoming a whistleblower, including his use of Tor, in his new book, Permanent Record.
As a contribution to our campaign to take back the internet, Ed has given us three signed cards to include inside copies of his book for our supporters. If you make a donation of $75 or more* between 12/26 and 12/28, you will be entered to win one of three copies of Permanent Record with a card signed by Edward Snowden inside.
This is a very special gift. Snowden is one of the most famous Tor users, and he represents a couple of important use cases for Tor. The first is that journalists—and the sources and whistleblowers they speak to—need to protect their online communications. They can use Tor, and tools like SecureDrop from Freedom of the Press Foundation (where Snowden is President of the Board) to do so. SecureDrop, which uses onion services to obfuscate metadata, allows media outlets to provide a secure, end-to-end encrypted method of communication between sources and journalists.
If you look at the way post-2013 whistleblowers have been caught, it is clear the absolute most important thing you can do to maintain your anonymity is reduce the number of places in your operational activity where you can make mistakes. Tor and Tails still do precisely that.
— Edward Snowden (@Snowden) August 24, 2019
The second most common use case of Tor is the need to protect one's privacy against mass surveillance. In both of these use cases, Tor allows people to take back the internet. In Snowden’s case, using Tor allowed him to fulfil his oath to the constitution of the United States and release information of public interest to the media about the abuses committed by the government through its mass surveillance program.
“The classified joke was that trying to surveil the Tor network makes spies want to cry. Therein lies the project’s irony: here was a US military-developed technology that made cyberintelligence simultaneously harder and easier, applying hacker know-how to protect the anonymity of IC officers, but only at the price of granting that same anonymity to adversaries and to average users across the globe. In this sense, Tor was even more neutral than Switzerland. For me personally, Tor was a life changer, bringing me back to the Internet of my childhood by giving me just the slightest taste of freedom from being observed.” (Permanent Record, page 156)
Today, as we run a campaign about taking back the internet, people understand why this is important. It's because of the awareness that Snowden’s revelations brought to people regarding the reality of mass surveillance. And just like Snowden, there are millions of people in the world who are doing all they can to share information about injustice in hopes of building social change. Talking about inequity isn’t usually easy, and it’s often not safe. These people need Tor so they can effectively use the internet as a channel to spread and access this information.
By supporting Tor, you are supporting us as we help millions of people around the world to Take Back the Internet.
And now, in addition to the Tor swag we offer as gifts for your donation, for the next two days (between 12/26 and 12/28), a donation of $75* or more will enter you to win one of three cards signed by Edward Snowden with a copy of Permanent Record.
Thank you for your support. And thank you, Edward Snowden, for taking a stand against mass surveillance and your continued support of the Tor Project.
* Donations are not necessary to enter, but much appreciated. Email giving@torproject.org if you would like to enter without donating.
Description: Mare Nostrum
Cindy Cohn, Executive Director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and Board Member of the Tor Project, was named one of America's Top 50 Women in Tech 2018 by Forbes.
As a tireless defender of digital rights, we wanted to get her take on the state of the internet today, recent victories and challenges ahead, and Tor’s role in taking back the internet.
How would you describe the internet today?
Disempowering. Between surveillance business models, national security surveillance, and ineffective legal and technical protections, many people feel that they have no power to protect their security and privacy.
But the good news is that we can regain control, and more people than ever are demanding a course change. Tor is a critical tool to helping us make that shift.
What do you think are some key victories that have happened in the past year to advance privacy and freedom online?
Tor and the Tor network just keeps getting stronger, more important, and easier to use. That’s amazing and a testament to the fierce, powerful and smart people who develop, support, maintain, and protect it.
I’m also heartened by the growing recognition across the world that privacy and security are linked and that technical, legal, and policy work is all needed to protect them.
I’m biased, but I think that a major step toward protecting people’s privacy as they cross the US border came in the Alasaad case EFF and the ACLU handled, where the court agreed with us that the US government needs reasonable suspicion to search the devices that people carry.
The ongoing efforts to encrypt the web and increase awareness about security tools and practices are also cause for celebration.
What challenges do you think privacy advocates and developers will face in the next year online?
I think the rise of authoritarianism around the world will continue to present challenges for privacy advocates and developers. One of the key things that would-be dictators know is that they have to prevent the people from being able to speak and learn things confidentially. This means more attacks on encryption.
I think that advocates and developers will need to continue to stand up for encryption and also ultimately will have to address the need to re-decentralize the internet. The pressures on the tech giants to make sure that no one can have a private conversation online will continue. We need to be ready and build out alternatives.
What is the internet you would like to see in the future?
We need to build a world where everyone has free (as in speech) access to read, speak, create, and control their experience, including creating their own tools and protecting their own privacy. A world where humans have the legal, policy, and cultural support and protection to do so. Where individuals have the strength and processing power to take on larger organizations, whether government or corporate, as well as to be protected from them. A world where our technology, whether as simple as an email or as complex as an AI system, is trustworthy and loyal to us.
Why do you think people should support and care about Tor?
If you care about maintaining (or creating) a society that can change — where ideas can grow and information can be learned free of control by governments or corporations — then Tor is one of the critical tools that you should support and care about.
Tor protects the canaries in the coal mines.
Even if you personally don’t need the protection that Tor offers, standing up for Tor is standing with the people who take risks to keep the rest of us informed about some of the most dangerous and important facts and issues facing the planet.
The emails from this Trac server go to my spam folder because they are sent from a server that is not listed in the SPF record.
From Address: trac @ trac.i2p2.no Email Server: mail05.sigterm.no [193.150.121.6] SPF Record: v=spf1 a mx ip4:193.150.121.30 ip4:193.150.121.27 ip4:193.150.121.69 ip4:193.150.121.24 ip4:193.150.121.173 ~all
The simple solution, assuming that no other email server is used to send out emails from this system, is to modify the SPF record to be the following:
v=spf1 a mx ip4:193.150.121.6 ip4:193.150.121.30 ip4:193.150.121.27 ip4:193.150.121.69 ip4:193.150.121.24 ip4:193.150.121.173 ~all
I am the developer of Privacy Browser. https://www.stoutner.com/privacy-browser/. The upcoming 3.3 release will include an option to proxy through I2P.
I looked over the integration options in https://github.com/i2p/i2p.android.base/blob/master/lib/helper/src/main/java/net/i2p/android/ui/I2PAndroidHelper.java. I noticed that if a third party app wants to start I2P it needs to use startActivity()
or startActivityForResult()
. Specifically,
Intent i = new Intent("net.i2p.android.router.START_I2P"); activity.startActivityForResult(i, REQUEST_START_I2P);
This isn't as slick as the the options I have with Orbot, where I can use a broadcast intent.
Create an intent to request Orbot to start.
Intent orbotIntent = new Intent("org.torproject.android.intent.action.START");
Send the intent to the Orbot package.
orbotIntent.setPackage("org.torproject.android");
Request a status response be sent back to this package.
orbotIntent.putExtra("org.torproject.android.intent.extra.PACKAGE_NAME", context.getPackageName());
Make it so.
context.sendBroadcast(orbotIntent);
The beauty of this approach is that it let's my app start Orbot in the background, without making the user leave the app.
I am not aware of any possible negative consequences to using a broadcast intent. Would you be amenable to adding an option for one to I2P?
Description: The portfolio and graphic design works of artist R.V.Klein.
Recently, Tobias Pulls and Rasmus Dahlberg published a paper entitled Website Fingerprinting with Website Oracles.
"Website fingerprinting" is a category of attack where an adversary observes a user's encrypted data traffic, and uses traffic timing and quantity to guess what website that user is visiting. In this attack, the adversary has a database of web pages, and regularly downloads all of them in order to record their traffic timing and quantity characteristics, for comparison against encrypted traffic, to find potential target matches.
Practical website traffic fingerprinting attacks against the live Tor network have been limited by the sheer quantity and variety of all kinds (and combinations) of traffic that the Tor network carries. The paper reviews some of these practical difficulties in sections 2.4 and 7.3.
However, if specific types of traffic can be isolated, such as through onion service circuit setup fingerprinting, the attack seems more practical. This is why we recently deployed cover traffic to obscure client side onion service circuit setup.
To address the problem of practicality against the entire Internet, this paper uses various kinds of public Internet infrastructure as side channels to narrow the set of websites and website visit times that an adversary has to consider. This allows the attacker to add confidence to their classifier's guesses, and rule out false positives, for low cost. The paper calls these side channels "Website Oracles".
As this table illustrates, several of these Website Oracles are low-cost/low-effort and have high coverage. We're particularly concerned with DNS, Real Time Bidding, and OCSP.
All of these oracles matter to varying degrees for non-Tor Internet users too, particularly in instances of centralized plaintext services. Because both DNS and OCSP are in plaintext, and because it is common practice for DNS to be centralized to public resolvers, and because OCSP queries are already centralized to the browser CAs, DNS and OCSP are good collection points to get website visit activity for large numbers of Internet users, not just Tor users.
Real Time Bidding ad networks are also a vector that Mozilla and EFF should be concerned about for non-Tor users, as they leak even more information about non-Tor users to ad network customers. Advertisers need not even pay anything or serve any ads to get information about all users who visit all sites that use the RTB ad network. On these bidding networks, visitor information is freely handed out to help ad buyers decide which users/visits they want to serve ads to. Nothing prevents advertisers from retaining this information for their own purposes, which also enables them to mount attacks, such as the one Tobias and Rasmus studied.
In terms of mitigating the use of these vectors in attacks against Tor, here's our recommendations for various groups in our community:
Because Tor uses encrypted TLS connections to carry multiple circuits, an adversary that externally observes Tor client traffic to a Tor Guard node will have a significantly harder time performing classification if that Tor client is doing multiple things at the same time. This was studied in section 6.3 of this paper by Tao Wang and Ian Goldberg. A similar argument can be made for mixing your client traffic with your own Tor Relay or Tor Bridge that you run, but that is very tricky to do correctly for it to actually help.
Exit relay operators should follow our recommendations for DNS. Specificially: avoid public DNS resolvers like 1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8 as they can be easily monitored and have unknown/unverifiable log retention policies. This also means don't use public centralized DNS-Over-HTTPS resolvers, either (sadly). Additionally, we will be working on improvements to the DNS cache in Tor via ticket 32678. When those improvements are implemented, DNS caching on your local resolver should be disabled, in favor of Tor's DNS cache.
The ability of customers of Real Time Bidding ad networks to get so much information about website visit activity of regular users without even paying to run ads should be a concern of all Internet users, not just Tor users. Some Real Time Bidding networks perform some data minimization and blinding, but it is not clear which ones do this, and to what degree. Any that perform insufficient data minimization should be shamed and added to bad actor block lists. For us, anything that informs all bidders that a visit is from Tor *before* they win the bid (e.g., by giving out distinct browser fingerprints that can be tied to Tor Browser or IP addresses that can be associated with exit relays) is leaking too much information.
The Tor Project would participate in an adblocker campaign that specifically targets bad actors such as cryptominers, fingerprinters, and Real Time Bidding ad networks that perform little or no data minimization to bidders. We will not deploy general purpose ad blocking, though. Even for obvious ad networks that set visible cookies, coverage is 80% at best and often much lower. We need to specifically target widely-used Real Time Bidding ad networks for this to be effective.
If you run a sensitive website, hosting it as a v3 onion service is your best option. v2 onion services have their own Website Oracle that was mitigated by the v3 design. If you must also maintain a clear web presence, staple OCSP, avoid Real Time Bidding ad networks, and avoid using large-scale CDNs with log retention policies that you do not directly control. For all services and third party content elements on your site, you should ensure there is no IP address retention, and no high-resolution timing information retention (log timestamps should be truncated at the minute, hour, or day; which level depends on your visitor frequency).
We welcome and encourage research into cover traffic defenses for the general problem of Website Traffic Fingerprinting. We encourage researchers to review the circuit padding framework documentation and use it to develop novel defenses that can be easily deployed in Tor.
sendNext.clear() should be put last in the loop as it currently defeats subsequent debug statements.
got the following error:
ERROR [acket pusher] er.transport.udp.PacketBuilder?: Size is 1456 for 1456 byte pkt with [2601:c7:8280:2050:fcf5:9497:4943:9ba3]:37535 data size 1397 pkt size 1504 MTU 1488 -3 for all acks, -3 for full acks, -1 full acks included, 0 partial acks included, Fragments: [Fragment 0 (1397 bytes) of OB Message 1981530637 type 11 with 2 fragments of size 1707 volleys: 1 lifetime: 902 pending fragments: 0 1
packet to be sent on IPv6 with fragment size from IPv4. First send attempt after 902 ms suggests peer changed through loadFrom() and states were transferred.
If that is true, messages should not be transferred/refragmented when loading from v4 to v6 because of woes with partial ACKing.
This guest post is from Alex Gladstein, Chief Strategy Officer for Human Rights Foundation. To read even more about Tor and cryptocurrency see this post. We are nearing the end of our end-of-year campaign #TakeBacktheInternet. Please donate cryptocurrency or fiat today.
Disclaimer: we invite guest posts on this blog based on the content of the post, and these posts aren't intended to endorse the guest poster or their organization.
The Tor community understands the paramount importance of private communications. While politicians or pundits may try to discredit encrypted messaging by saying, “what do you have to hide?” or by asserting that only drug dealers or criminals would need to conceal their communications, you know better. Without privacy, we’re on a slippery slope to an Orwellian surveillance state, similar to what’s tragically unfolding inside China today.
But what you may not have considered is the equally paramount importance of financial privacy. The money we all use on a daily basis has evolved from a bearer asset to a surveillance mechanism. Your transaction history arguably says more about you than your email and text history. If I really want to know what you’re doing, I want to see your bank and credit card statements. And with the latest big-data analysis, a government can sift through bulk financial data to enforce a police state or install ambitious social engineering schemes. Similarly, corporations can continue to exploit and sell your personal information in a growing wave of surveillance capitalism.
In the same way that we rely on technology like Tor to protect our communications and internet browsing, we need to start protecting our financial privacy. This wasn’t possible online until the invention of Bitcoin, a peer-to-peer payment network with no middleman. In Bitcoin, there is no central authority that approves transactions. Instead, it’s done through a decentralized global competition, so no censorship is possible, even from state actors. And there is no third party freezing undesirable payments or controlling detailed user data.
It’s critical to note that Bitcoin is a pseudonymous network, and with enough effort, your transactions can be linked to real-world identities and users can be deanonymized. But it’s equally critical to note that with good operational security, you can make it difficult for anyone to know how you are spending your money. The caveat is that this is essentially an expert-level task at the moment. Strategies like running a full Bitcoin node over Tor, using cutting-edge mixers, and avoiding centralized exchanges that enforce KYC “Know Your Customer” regulations are out of reach for the average Bitcoin user. But the blueprint exists for making daily payments for the average person private using Bitcoin as a foundational technology.
One way to do this may be through the Lightning Network, an open-source payment network that sits on Bitcoin as a second layer, harnessing onion routing to help transmit Bitcoin in a way that’s extremely difficult to trace. Just as paper notes were used as a scaling solution for gold bars, and Visa was used a scaling solution for the U.S. dollar, Lightning could very well be the scaling solution for Bitcoin, with the extra benefit that it can transform Bitcoin’s pseudonymous payment structure into something that’s virtually anonymous. Lightning is nascent today, and needs a lot of work. But the building blocks are there for you to be able to, within a year or two, use it to make the equivalent of cash transactions in the digital world.
When you buy a cup of coffee, or take friends to dinner, or subscribe to a podcast, or purchase a book, no one else needs to know. That is your private decision. And you can still protect that decision by using cash to do those things. But increasingly, cash is fading around the world. In a decade or two, it will be entirely gone. Using digital cash is one way to take back the internet and protect what privacy we have. The Tor and Bitcoin communities can make for powerful allies in this effort.
Tor software is critical to the future of privacy online. Help us keep Tor strong and take back the internet by making a cryptocurrency or fiat donation today.
Description: E8 - Organization for Awareness and Emergence
Im a MW user. Im also trying to promote MW best as i can, so obviously I2P at the same time. Seems like with my router network status to ok, i can not share over 50kb/s. This is hurtful. https://www.reddit.com/r/thehatedone/comments/e3wa6s/muwire_p2p_anonymous_file_sharing_and_chat/ I know zzz's helping zab's with the MW web UI plugin, thats really cool. However, the sharing network speed to max 50kb/s is hurting MW. Im sharing right now, 15 files between 700mb to over 3gb. This will take close to 30 days to share. (2gb per day) Note: Before you tell me that i should be running 9.44. Im running the I2P Browser with the embedded router, im waiting for 9.44. Although, the I2P Browser does have the new interface but router still under 9.43.
I've opened this ticket: http://trac.i2p2.i2p/ticket/2670 However, i cant find the way to reply, im blind? I've tried to enable js and i still cant find where to reply. Also, im not the owner of my own ticket anymore, its zzz?